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de más la recomendación que escribe
Gadamer en Los caminos de Heidegger
(p. 416) al referirse a este otro filósofo
alemán: «la vida es brumosa» (diesig).
Y es que si omitimos las consideraciones
de Gadamer en cuanto al diálogo que se
mantiene con el poema, podemos llegar
a pensar que este lo concibe como dies
hier, es decir, como esto que hay aquí y
que, por tanto, podría desvelarse en su
totalidad a través de la mediación del lec-
tor (inter)medio; mientras que tal como
pasa con los caminos de bosque (Holz-
wege) heideggerianos, el lector debe prac-
ticar la reflexión a sabiendas que en oca-
siones hay que darse la vuelta y regresar
de algunos senderos que no llevan a nin-
guna parte al estar uno frente al diesig, a la
bruma.
Para finalizar, cabe señalar lo que
escribe Gadamer en Verdad y método:
«El que me encarece mucho la recons-
trucción e insiste en la diferencia, se encuen-
tra al comienzo de un diálogo, no al final»
(p. 359). Y es que en esas palabras dedi-
cadas a Derrida encontramos la posición
conciliadora de Gadamer, quien, lejos de
buscar realizar comentarios fijos y atem-
porales para los poemas de «Atemkris-
tall», resulta sabedor de lo difícil que
resulta abarcar a ese erizo que para Derri-
da resulta ser la poesía y al que Caner-
Liese se enfrenta en su obra. En cuanto
a las acotaciones y comentarios que el
autor realiza a los poemas comentados
por Gadamer, sin duda el lector podrá
decidir por sí mismo, y seguramente lo
más interesante de la obra sea la invita-
ción al lector a acercarse a esos dos gran-
des que son Hans-Georg Gadamer y Paul
Celan.
Francis García Collado
Universitat de Barcelona
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CORSE, Sandra (2009)
Craft Objects, Aesthetic Contexts - Kant, Heidegger and Adorno on Craft
Plymouth, UK: University Press of America, 100 p.
This book is an attempt to address the
philosophical relevance of craft objects
and practices and will be of interest for
those wishing to revisit the readings of
Kant, Heidegger and Adorno on art and
aesthetics from a different standpoint.
The book is original for its efforts to pro-
vide a philosophical basis to the reflec-
tions about craft (which is considered in the
fields of anthropology and history of art,
but seldom in philosophy) and to pro-
vide a revision of the previous readings
of these authors from the standpoint of
craft rather than art. Nevertheless, because
of the rather risky approach of focusing
the attention, differently from tradition-
al art-biased aesthetics, on craft, at times
it has also a number of problems that
ought to be pointed out. However, even
if this is so, it is worthwhile considering
this reading from Sandra Corse, retired
lecturer from the School of Literature,
Communication and Culture at Georgia
Tech in Atlanta. This book, edited by the
renowned University Press of America,
will be useful for elementary and more
specialised courses in aesthetics, in order
to update and bring to awareness certain
traditional (and often partial) interpreta-
tions of the authors presented in this
book.
Corse divides her book into four main
chapters. The first chapter focuses on
explaining and justifying the reasons for
conducting a philosophical reflection on
craft. The rest of the chapters respective-
ly summarise the theories of Kant, Hei-
degger and Adorno. Corse’s aim is to
demonstrate the relevance of these theo-
ries to better understand what craft is and
how it relates to aesthetic and cognitive
experiences.
The first chapter is perhaps the most
interesting for those not familiarised with
contemporary craft objects and theories.
The chapter is divided in two parts: the
first addresses the current debate, con-
cerning what craft is and how it relates to
art. The second part is an effort to clari-
fy the current debate in analytic philoso-
phy, concerning what art is and how it
relates to craft.
In the first part of the first chapter,
Corse clarifies some conceptual and his-
torical distinctions concerning craft. She
also introduces some of the theories devel-
oped by Risatti, Greenhalgh and Metcalf
concerning the current debate about what
craft is (i.e., definitions of craft). In this
section Corse also considers that it is nec-
essary to distinguish between contempo-
rary Studio Craft, based on the Arts and
Crafts movement of the 19th century,
which rejected industrialisation and mass
manufacture, from the more traditional
craft practices, which simply aimed at pro-
ducing goods for daily life. In doing this,
she insists her addressing to the former
type of craft, which she claims is a new
division of art. Often to dispel any mis-
understandings she refers to this former
type of craft as «Studio Craft» or «Fine
Craft» (in order to draw a better parallel
to «Fine Art»).
Through her summary of Rissatti’s,
Metcalf ’s and Greenhalgh’s definitions of
craft, she attempts to find not only the
similarities between Fine Craft and Fine
Art, but also to find their differences. She
also attempts to counter Collingwood’s
type of ideas about craft (as considered
less valuable than art). To do so, she also
insists that Fine Craft is actually a divi-
sion of art, and thus is also as valuable as
Fine Art. However, she also claims that
differently to Fine Art, Fine (or Studio)
Craft stresses other equally acceptable val-
ues, such as the role of historical materi-
als and techniques as well as the central
role of the hand-made manufacture, its
place in everydayness and its provision of
a more functional and thus more afford-
able understanding of the world. It is also
relevant that she points out the fact that
contemporary (fine) artists are also cur-
rently turning towards craft techniques
and materials to produce their artworks,
thus providing additional reasons for con-
sidering the study of craft objects, prac-
tices and theories in contemporary aes-
thetics.
The second part of the first chapter is
perhaps less original for those familiarised
with contemporary analytic aesthetics.
This is because it basically summarises
the contemporary debate in analytic aes-
thetics concerning what art is. The read-
ers, however, should be careful in fol-
lowing this section, as Corse, when
addressing this debate, is not as precise
as in the earlier part. This is because, in
the first place, her interpretation of
Weitz’s theory against definitions of art,
is presented as proto-institutionalist of
sorts, something for which there should
be serious reservations (at least if no fur-
ther justification is provided). Also her
summary of this debate in terms of
Davies’ distinction between functional
and procedural definitions, as if this was
an already accepted distinction, is per-
haps taken a bit to eagerly, as settling the
distinction between the different types
of definitions of art in current analytic
aesthetics. Perhaps the most interesting
reflection of this section is the parallel
Corse draws (first proposed by Metcalf )
between the Artworld and the Craft-
world. In doing so, she attempts to reflect
about craft objects in terms similar to
those of Danto, Dickie or Davies when
theorising about art. That is to say, she
is interested in reflecting about craft in
terms of its being a social activity that
depends upon and allows for the creation
of social networks of influence, the trans-
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mission of tradition and the cultural
development of society.
The second chapter is entirely dedi-
cated to Kant’s Critique of the Power of
Judgment. This is perhaps one of the most
interesting and well-argued chapters, as
it combines a thorough explanation of
Kant’s theory with a well managed criti-
cism against previous interpretations of
Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft (KU). In this
sense, this chapter is very relevant because
Corse argues that Kant’s KU has been and
still is either the main theoretical basis for
certain aesthetic theorists (or art critics
such as Greenberg) when reflecting on
art, or the main object of criticisms. This
latter type of criticism accuses Kant on
the grounds of providing the basis for an
arbitrarily-biased modernist interpreta-
tion against non-aesthetic theories of art
and against craft objects and practices.
Corse argues that the latter is not the case
at all because it is an incorrect interpre-
tation of Kant’s KU. Moreover, she also
claims that those departing from Kant to
theorise about art and aesthetics (the for-
mer group) have often also misinterpret-
ed Kant’s theory.
Thus, in the first place Corse stress-
es that Kant was not so much interested
in art as in the aesthetic experience, first
of nature and then of art. In the second
place she also claims that, although Kant
was interested in pure judgments, this was
just for the sake of clarifying what a judg-
ment is (i.e., for methodological reasons).
But, she argues, Kant never claimed that
in order to be valid, aesthetic judgments
ought to be pure. Thus, for example,
there are also mixed judgments (v.g., con-
cerning adherent beauty) that were consid-
ered by him as also valid types of aesthetic
judgments. In the third place, she insists
that Kant brought examples from art as
well as from craft (v.g., clothing and fur-
niture) and functional design (v.g., wall-
papers) when explaining the nature of
pure judgments. Finally, when Kant
talked about art, the distinction between
art and craft as understood today was not
yet clearly settled, thus leading him also
to consider together, cases of painting,
gardening, architecture, furniture and
clothing. All these remarks help Corse to
dispel the interpretation of Kant’s KU
understood either as a descriptive or nor-
mative theory of aesthetic judgment
(i.e., as if it were a Critique of Pure Aes-
thetic Judgment) or as a critique mainly
related to pure art (i.e., as if it were a Cri-
tique of Pure Art) thus inapplicable to craft.
In the third chapter, Corse addresses
Heidegger’s theory, particularly that of
«The Origin of the Work of Art» to reflect
about craft. To develop this chapter, she
previously summarises Heidegger’s earli-
er theories of Being and Time and of «The
Question Concerning Technology». She
first examines Heidegger’s reflections on
tools and equipment to understand Hei-
degger’s theory of Dasein as a Being-in-
the-world necessarily engaged in a given
network of social and practical relations.
Secondly, she examines Heidegger’s exam-
ples of art, in which either craft is oblique-
ly mentioned (the peasant’s shoes in Van
Gogh’s painting) or in which it is possi-
ble to establish an analogy with craft
works (the Greek temple). Corse consid-
ers that Heidegger’s conception about
craft is not very different from that of
Collingwood (i.e., craft as less relevant
and creative than art). To counter this
biased conception, she claims that actu-
ally craft ought not to be considered as
simply something between things and art
(i.e., as tools) as Heidegger seems to pos-
tulate. In fact, she claims that Heidegger,
when referring to craft, is actually talking
about ordinary tools (v.g., a hammer),
rather than about Fine Craft. This is
because she argues that Fine or Studio
Craft is actually a type of art. Thus she
finally claims that Heidegger’s reflections
that best suit Fine Crafts are those relat-
ed to the example of the Greek temple (as
craft-like artwork), rather than those relat-
ed to examples of equipment such as a
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hammer or the peasants boots (as mere
craft-like equipment).
The reason for also considering Hei-
degger is because Corse attempts to go
beyond the aesthetic conception of craft
suggested in the previous chapter about
Kant’s theory, in order to stress the role
of craft in both disclosing and creating a
world (as in Van Gogh’s painting and the
Greek temple, respectively). In doing so,
she also defends the role of Fine Craft in
revealing better than works of Fine Art,
the struggle between world and earth,
because both the materials and the tradi-
tional networks of social meanings and
interactions are central in these types of
objects.
However, even if Corse succeeds in
providing good reasons for understand-
ing works of Fine Craft as both disclos-
ing and revealing worlds, as art does, nev-
ertheless towards the end it becomes
disappointingly clear that she has been
actually unable to really talk about craft
(as «the other» of art). This is because, on
the one hand, she stresses that works of
Fine Craft have the same functions as Van
Gogh’s painting and, more particularly,
the Greek temple qua artworks that they
are. On the other hand, because she stress-
es on several occasions that Fine Craft
actually is a type of art. Thus in the chap-
ter about Heidegger, Corse is covering the
fact that she is merely summarising Hei-
degger’s theory of art (i.e., of craft qua
art). In doing so, she is thus indirectly
endorsing Collingwood’s and Heidegger
notion of non-artistic craft, as «the other»
of art understood as less relevant than art
(i.e., craft as mere tools or equipments
destined to be used but lacking imagina-
tive creativity and of covering truth rather
than being «truth-setting-itself-into-
work»). Nevertheless, it has to be said also
that Corse summarises Heidegger’s theo-
ry of art in a heuristically-clear and sug-
gestive manner. So this chapter will any-
way be useful for those interested in both
understanding Heidegger’s theories of art
and to have a better understanding of
works of craft artists (qua art makers) as
also revealing and generating worlds.
The fourth chapter is about Adorno’s
philosophy of art. Differently from the
other chapters, this one is not addressed to
point out Adorno’s references to works of
craft nor to clarify his position in relation
to them, as Corse does more or less suc-
cessfully with Kant’s and Heidegger’s the-
ories. In this chapter she attempts, instead,
to show how Adorno’s theory of art can
be very useful for a theory of craft. This is
because she claims that Adorno’s position
concerning certain notions, such as those
of materiality, historicity, heterogeneity
and mimesis, can be easily applied to
works of craft as well.
However, even if Adorno’s philoso-
phy of art might be suggestive for a phi-
losophy of craft, and even though this
chapter also presents a thorough exami-
nation and a good knowledge of Adorno’s
theories, in terms of the overall idea of
the book, this is the weakest chapter. The
reason for this is that, owing to the fact
that Adorno doesn’t mention craft in his
reflections, it seems either as if Corse, as
an excuse to talk about craft, has chosen
Adorno basically to show her mastery of
the author, or as if she would be claim-
ing that Adorno’s theory is de facto a the-
ory of craft (or alternatively a plausible
basis for a theory of craft). Perhaps this
is why she sometimes switches the term
«Studio Craft» for that of «serious craft» to
better defend that it is akin to Adorno’s
notion of «serious art». However, the idea
that Adorno would find craft as an accept-
able type of art is something for which
we should have serious reservations given
Adorno’s criticism of consumerist society
and his stressing of the autonomy of art.
This points towards the idea that the
chapter on Adorno is an unnecessary
addendum to this book, unless the author
could conclusively demonstrate that
Adorno would have accepted craft as art.
This is what Corse continuously argues
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to be the case, but this claim seems to be
completely unjustified owing to Adorno’s
particular elitist view concerning art.
Additionally, it is not possible here, as it
actually was in Heidegger’s theory, to eas-
ily consider that, owing to the fact that
Fine Craft is a branch of art, his reflec-
tions about art are thus also applicable to
Fine Craft. This doesn’t seem plausible
with Adorno because of his normative
conception of art which segregates seri-
ous art, as real art, from the other types
of arts (probably also Fine Craft) as a sim-
ple entertainment or as being simply
objects for consumption.
To conclude, this book will be attrac-
tive to those interested in having a bet-
ter understanding of Kant’s, Heidegger’s
and Adorno’s theories by revisiting them
from a different critical standpoint. It
will also be attractive to those interested
in having a better understanding of those
craft theories, works and practices sur-
rounding the craftworld. It is true that
the contributions to a theory of craft, by
Heidegger’s and above all Adorno’s the-
ories, are not always very clear. Never-
theless, it is an interesting and suggestive
first attempt to provide the theory of craft
with a philosophical basis from solid
philosophical figures, something for
which, even if it is a risky move, has its
merits because it attempts to correct the
traditional prejudice in philosophy
against craft. Although the future success
of this attempt is still unclear, any
attempt, such as Corse’s, to enrich the
debate concerning the relations between
art and craft with serious philosophical
tools and analysis is always welcome.
Above all, it is welcome if this gives fresh-
ness to the philosophical panorama that
regretfully tends to mimic a philosophi-
cal conception of art that traditionally
and unjustifiably is dismissive of craft
and those practices surrounding the craft-
world.
Gabriel Lemkow Tovias
University of East Anglia
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KONNERSMANN, Ralf (2008)
Kulturkritik
Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 137 p.
Hi ha actualment a Alemanya, per part
d’autors especialitzats en filosofia de la
cultura, un nou interès per la crítica.
Aquest és el cas de Ralf Konnersmann,
professor de la Universitat Christian-
Albert de Kiel, i autor de diverses obres,
entre elles la direcció del Diccionari de les
metàfores filosòfiques, i de la publicació
Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie.
Dels diferents aspectes tractats en els
primers capítols d’aquest llibre curt però
intens, dos resulten especialment interes-
sants per a un lector del segle XXI. En pri-
mer lloc, la determinació del tipus de
societat en la qual ha estat possible que
sorgís la crítica de la cultura; això és: en
societats dinàmiques, amb estructures de
gran complexitat, on hi ha una conscièn-
cia del llenguatge, i que són capaces de
reflexionar sobre si mateixes. Aquestes
condicions són les que s’han produït en
les cultures occidentals.
En segon lloc, l’autor posa especial
èmfasi a explicar el principal canvi que la
crítica de la cultura ha experimentat en els
darrers anys: ha deixat de ser l’exercici d’un
grup d’experts que es considerava que esta-
ven en possessió de la veritat, o que usaven
millor la raó, o que tenien un major conei-
xement de la història, i ha passat a ser una
activitat que qualsevol ciutadà pot exercir,
usant els més diversos mitjans i registres.
